Outsourcing War: How Russia and Other Nations Weaponise Poverty for Recruitment Purposes

©“Bucha. Faces of War. - Ukraine War Photo Exhibition 2023” by Houses of the Oireachtas. Licensed byCC BY 2.0

In his speeches, Vladimir Putin portrays the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a national struggle that unites all the Russian people. Yet Putin’s claims do not hold up under closer scrutiny. In reality, Russia has increasingly relied on poverty as a key recruitment tool both within and outside its borders. Russia weaponises poverty by turning economic desperation into military manpower by offering money, contracts, or legal status to people with few real alternatives. 

The Deal With the Devil

The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been going on for over 4 years. It is the largest war on the European continent since the Second World War. Russia has been able to sustain this war despite suffering massive casualties, which some experts place above three hundred thousand men dead, without a forced mobilisation policy. The one time a partial mobilisation was announced in the autumn of 2022, it sparked the only mass protests since the war began. The Russian population so far is willing to ignore the decreasing political freedoms or the atrocities committed by the Russian army in Ukraine. Yet any proposal resembling forced military conscription has led to severe public backlash and growing tension between the government and the people. The Russian government understands this. As a result, the vast bulk of Russian soldiers invading Ukraine are contract soldiers serving under agreements with the Russian army, rather than conscripts. 

The reason this system has been effective so far is not that there is a huge supply of men willing to fight for ideological reasons, but rather the lucrative nature of these military contracts. For many Russians, especially those living far from big cities located in the European part of Russia, a contract with the Russian military seems to be the only way out of poverty. These contracts offer a 400,000 ruble sign-up bonus. Overall, payments can exceed 2 million rubles. Furthermore, in case of a soldier’s death, his immediate family can receive a substantial compensation payment from the state. For context, the average salary in Russia is about 80,000 rubles. In some of Russia's poorer regions, this figure can be as low as 40,000 rubles. Thus, it may not seem surprising that various statistics indicate that people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and regions are disproportionately represented in the Russian military. Vladimir Putin has claimed that in 2025 alone, more than 400,000 people signed contracts with the Russian army. Rather than relying on the population's patriotic enthusiasm, the Kremlin created a system in which military service functions like a high-risk labour market that allows impoverished individuals to improve their financial well-being. 

What adds another layer to this situation is that the nature of Russian recruitment directly affects how the role of ordinary Russians in this war is perceived. A common argument used by some of the Russian opposition members is that it is Putin’s war and that the vast majority of Russians do not support it. Yet when a large share of Russian soldiers currently fighting in Ukraine appear to be serving under voluntary contracts rather than formal mobilisation orders, this argument becomes harder to sustain.

Russian recruitment does not end where Russia's borders end. There is substantial evidence of the Russian state recruiting people from lower-income countries, including regions like South and Central Asia, as well as Africa. Here, Russia employs the same tactics, offering lucrative contracts to people suffering from extreme poverty. For them, these contracts can help them and their entire families to climb the social ladder. In some cases, people being recruited are misled into believing they will be completing construction work in Russia. They find out the truth only when they are already in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine and are forced to enlist with the Russian army. In India, the issue got so bad that Modi discussed the issue of the Russian military recruiting Indian citizens with Putin directly. In addition to this, the Russian military also offers a simplified process of obtaining Russian citizenship for both legal and illegal immigrants currently residing in Russia, with the vast majority of these migrants coming from Central Asian countries. Russia essentially found a way to "outsource" its war of aggression to other countries. Taking advantage of and weaponising extreme levels of poverty in these places. 

Beyond Russia: Recruitment in the United States 

Russia may represent the most extreme version of this model but it is not the only state where military service is the most attractive to the people with fewest economic alternatives. Another major military power often accused of using poverty as a key recruitment tool is the United States of America. This phenomenon even has a name, as critics often describe the United States armed forces as a “poor man’s army”. Many military recruiters specifically target low-income neighborhoods. Various studies have shown that economic insecurity and limited civilian opportunities are among the main drivers of people enlisting in the US. Military recruiters are even given access to high school campuses and student contact information under rules introduced in the early 2000s. Thus, they have direct access to teenage students who may not have enough funds to go to college or see the military as the only way to advance professionally and escape poverty.  Nevertheless, for decades, the US military has pushed back against these accusations and has released various statistics showing how the majority of the US armed personnel come from middle rather than lower-class households.

However, there is an explanation to reconcile these seemingly contradictory statistics. U.S. Army recruiters may focus more on lower-income areas, but not everyone who signs up meets the eligibility criteria to enlist fully. The criteria include minimum entrance test score, physical and medical fitness, a high school diploma, and citizenship or lawful permanent residence. As a result, there is a funnel effect: the very poorest young people, who are most exposed to recruitment pressures, are also often more likely to face the exact barriers that disqualify applicants. This helps explain why the military can market itself most aggressively where opportunities are weakest, while still ending up with a force more middle-class than the stereotype suggests.

Another channel used by recruiting officers is the possibility of obtaining American citizenship. Since 2002, more than 187,000 service members have obtained U.S. citizenship through military naturalisation. While you do still need to have a valid green card to enlist, the process of naturalisation is extremely simplified, and the typical 5-year permanent residence requirement is waived. For some lawful permanent residents, this makes military service not only a source of income but also a route to faster legal and social inclusion in the United States.

©“VETERANS DAY CEREMONY 2009 - US ARMY AFRICA - 091110 (71)” by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa. Licensed by CC BY 2.0

No More Fighting for Ideals?

The parallels in Russia’s and the US's recruitment strategies highlight a broader problem facing many developed states: voluntary military service has become harder to sustain. Russia has had to offer increasingly high salaries and bonuses to attract contract soldiers, while also seeking recruits from abroad. The United States Army has also struggled with recruitment in recent years, with only around 23% of youth being fit for service, and 87% saying they are unlikely to consider military service. This trend can also be seen in Western European nations like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.

In the former Eastern Bloc, military service was obligatory. In combination with a lack of basic human rights, it meant that serving in the military became a part of life for generations. As mobilisation became less strict and Cold War tensions began to ease, serving in the army stopped being the norm. Once military service stopped being compulsory or socially expected, states had to find new ways to attract recruits. In many cases economic incentives became the one of the most effective substitutes. In the West, military service often remained more attractive to those with fewer economic opportunities and fewer alternative paths to stability. Yet as living standards improved and more employment opportunities became accessible, the number of people for whom the military was the only way out of poverty declined sharply. It is notable that nations like Russia and the USA, which have greater wealth inequality, are those where the recruitment shortage is less pronounced than in Western European nations. Where civilian opportunities are broader and welfare systems stronger, states have a harder time persuading citizens to accept the risks of military service on purely economic grounds.

Serving in the army across many cultures is portrayed primarily as a way to protect your nation and serve some higher purpose. It is impossible to measure whether the percentage of people who enlist in the military for idealistic purposes has declined over the decades. Surges in voluntary enlistment across Europe and North America usually occurred during periods of existential danger to the country they served. In developed countries, this is not the case. Wars are seen as endless political endeavours or something that can be resolved without your involvement, rather than as immediate struggles for national survival. As a result, appeals to patriotism alone are often no longer enough to fill the ranks.

What has remained consistent over the years is that a large share of people are joining the army to advance their careers and escape terrible living conditions. Thus, it should not be surprising that even today, the weaponisation of poverty still serves as one of the main recruitment tools for countries without a mandatory draft. The Russian case pushes this logic to an extreme, but it is a part of a wider pattern. Where states cannot compel military service, they often rely on economic insecurity to make it attractive. The policy implication is ugly and clear. As long as large parts of the population see military service as one of their few realistic paths to stability, poverty will remain embedded in how voluntary armies recruit.

©“Protector of Motherland” by Adam Baker. Licensed by CC BY 2.0